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Abstract: This research discusses the politics of identity that are increasingly strengthening in the 
public sphere. This phenomenon grows through the religious sentiment circulated massively on social 
media and is also evident in dress and daily behavior. This article wants to see: (1) the extent to which 
the identity of female students that wearing niqab influences the national insight, (2) how their 
perspectives and attitudes in national and state life. As a result, the sentiment of niqab female students' 
identity grew more vital in the public sphere. It is directly proportional to their low acceptance of 
government leaders of different religions. The government role is also considered lacking in helping 
them to overcome the life problems they face. Interestingly, the position of the Pancasila in the group 
gaining acceptance is relatively high. The primary data of this study through a questionnaire with the 
techniques of purposive sampling of 30 female students that wearing the niqab from various religious 
organisations spread across many campuses in the City of Palopo. 
Keywords: Campus life; dress code; identity; national insight; public sphere; social media. 
Abstrak: Penelitian ini membahas tentang politik identitas yang kian menguat dalam ruang publik. 
Gejala ini tumbuh berkembang melalui sentimen agama yang diedarkan secara masif di media sosial 
dan juga tampak nyata dalam cara berpakaian dan perilaku sehari-hari. Berangkat dari hal tersebut 
artikel ini ingin melihat: (1) sejauh mana identitas mahasiswi bercadar berpengaruh terhadap 
wawasan kebangsaan, (2) bagaimana cara pandang dan sikap mereka dalam hidup berbangsa dan 
bernegara. Hasilnya, Sentimen identitas mahasiswi bercadar berkembang semakin kuat dalam ruang 
publik. Hal ini berbanding lurus dengan rendahnya penerimaan mereka terhadap pemimpin 
pemerintah yang berbeda agama. Peran pemerintah juga dinilai kurang dalam membantu mengatasi 
persoalan-persoalan hidup yang mereka hadapi. Menariknya, posisi Pancasila di dalam kelompok 
mendapatkan penerimaan yang cukup tinggi. Data utama penelitian ini melalui kuesioner dengan 
teknik purpose sampling terhadap 30 mahasiswi bercadar dari sejumlah organisasi keagamaan yang 
tersebar di banyak kampus di Kota Palopo.  
Kata Kunci: Cara berpakaian; identitas; kehidupan kampus; media social; ruang publik; wawasan 
kebangsaan. 
1. Introduction 
Religion, a pre-modern primordial force, which has been tamed through the process of 
secularisation by confining it to private spaces, remains as a political force today (Hardiman, 2018). 
Everywhere we witness the return of religion into the public sphere, even religious discourse has been 
contesting with various secular lessons. Democracy is a sensible way to manage differences in the 
interests of the citizens who seem increasingly overwhelmed to face the invasion of religious identity 
sentiment (Nag, 2018), either in the form of information circulating on social media and that appears in 
everyday life. Social media, a channel for the release of political sentiments over religion, makes it 
difficult for the government to stem it. The  Information and Electronic Transaction (ITE) Law (Presiden 
Republik Indonesia, 2008), which is expected to reduce it, is seen by many activists of democracy as a 
counter-productive product in the spirit of democracy. 
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On the other hand, the practice of intolerance towards minority groups is a touchstone on the life 
of the nation and state. From this, the discourse of the majority group develops, the constitution of a 
democratic state is considered to conflict with Islamic law. From the Jakarta elections until now, the 
public ear has been accustomed to hearing dichotomous phrases such as "Which is better, defending 
the country or defending the Religion of God." 
Once the sentimentality was felt split the public life in two, there is pluralism and plurality on one 
side. There is also communitarianism, identity, and groups on the other side. The first hold to the 
argument that we live in a democratic rule of law; with that, the behavior of life in the public sphere 
must be guided by democratic norms. Religion is a private matter. The second one is driven by religious 
laws (Shari'a), which manifest in how to dress. 
Regarding secular law, it is considered something that can contaminate the faith, even the 
dichotomy of these two things can divide a family. Gallup International Poll recently released a survey 
result about The World's Most Religious Countries; thus, Indonesia became the third country out of 55 
countries whose inhabitants made religion a significant consideration in their daily lives. The study 
mentioned that Islam is the most popular religion in Indonesia, with 80.2% of its population. The 
Constitution of the Country guarantees the freedom to practice one's religion. The International 
spiritual movement called Subuh was founded in Indonesia (Gabrillin, 2019). 
According to historical records, the hijab in Indonesia was first worn by noblewomen in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi, in the 17th century. Then Javanese women adopted it in the early 1900s following 
Aisyiyah, one of the country's most prominent Islamic mass organisations (Qibtiyah, 2019). Under the 
New Order regime, the Ideologue of the government led by President Soeharto banns women from 
wearing hijab in public. The government believed that the hijab was a symbol of radicalism adopted 
from the Middle East. The government considers the veil to symbolise a radical understanding of 
religion imported from the Middle East. And This case was confirmed by the study of Jean Gelman 
Taylor's, The Professor of Historical Study from the University of New South Wales. He did not find a 
figure of hijab during the 1880s and 1890s in Indonesia (Taylor, 2003). 
Hijab is not just everyday clothes. It manifests a deep commitment or belief about the relationship 
or friendliness between men and illegitimate women (Mujani, 1993). Furthermore, the hijab received a 
wider negative stigma after the September 11, 2001 tragedy in the United States. Subsequently, the hijab 
was often associated with symptoms of religious fundamentalism. In addition, the violence that occurs 
in various sides of the world, especially in Indonesia, is often motivated by a religious doctrine in which 
the perpetrators of a husband and wife wears a niqab. In modern Indonesian society, the number of 
women wears hijab  Islamic veils increases significantly (Turmudi, 2016). They are growing rapidly on 
Islamic campuses and spread widely in the community. The hijab has nowadays was evolved to a 
further stage, namely the niqab. Then it brings greater rejection than the hijab. In addition to the negative 
stigma attached to the niqab, namely the flow of fundamental Islam, which is also closely related to 
terrorism, niqab also faces rejection from the government, especially public administration and services 
(Ratri, 2011). Within Islam itself, there is a different point of view about the limits of covering the 
roughness. The party in Islam believes that niqab is an obligation of every adult Muslim woman who is 
a minority. Two major organisations in Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah agree 
that closing the roughness may use the hijab, not the niqab.  
Up till now, there is no exact number of women who wears niqab in Indonesia. However, suppose 
the development of it is observed. In that case, it is growing rapidly among female students on Islamic 
campuses, such as the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) and the State Islamic University (UIN). 
Interestingly, wearing a niqab did not only comes from female students of Wahda Islamiyah and Salafi 
idea but also spread to various other Islamic organisations such as the Campus Da'wah Institute, 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian Student Action Unit (KAMMI), and the Islamic Student 
Association (HMI). From the introductory study taken by researchers, a kind of shared sentiment 
emerged about the identities of various Islamic organisations. The communitarian feelings of Islam 
strengthen through group boundaries as they are triggered by feelings of injustice that are not felt by 
many Islamic groups. It is developing a kind of nostalgia for the ideal community of religion through 
Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya 5, 2 (2021): 123-134 125 of 134 
Abdul Pirol, Aswan Aswan/Niqab in Indonesia: Identity and Nationalism of the Female Students in Palopo 
a "struggle for recognition" (Lash & Featherstone, 2001), which is slowly eroding national solidarity. 
Wearing a niqab in public is often considered to threaten the "neutrality" of the larger group, namely 
the nation (Hardiman, 2018). 
As reported by the Indonesian Survey Circle Study (LSI) Danny JA, the percentage of Indonesian 
community support for Pancasila in the last 13 years decreased by 10%. In 2005, the pro-Pancasila 
public number reached 85.2%. Five years later, in 2010, the figure was 81.7%. In 2015 the figure was 
79.4%, and in 2018 it was 75.3%. Other findings from the survey show that in the same period, the pro-
Pancasila public declined, while the pro-NKRI Sharia public experienced an increase of 9%. In 2005, the 
figure reached 4.6%, in 2010 it reached 7.3%, and in 2015 it reached 9.8%, and in 2018 the figure was 
13.2%. According to the survey results, there are three reasons why pro-Pancasila public factors are 
declining: economy, alternative understanding, and socialisation.  First, economic inequality is higher 
among the people. Public income below Rp 1 million pro-Pancasila in 2005 reached 91.8%, in 2010 it 
reached 85.7%, in 2015 it reached 79.1%, and in 2011 it reached 69.1%. While the public income above 
Rp 3 million in 2005 reached 77.8%, in 2010 it amounted to 76.8%, in 2015 it reached 76.6%, and in 2018 
it reached 76.4%. Second, alternative understanding is increasingly developing in society. An intensive 
understanding of alternatives beyond Pancasila can attract, especially the Muslim community. The pro-
Pancasila Muslim community in 2005 reached 85.6%, in 2010 it reached 81.8%, in 2015, it reached 79.1%, 
and in 2018 it was 74%. While other religions, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, and Buddhist, are pro-
Pancasila, stable with 82.8% in 2018. It is quite stable because the figures did not move far from 81.7% 
in 2005. Third, Pancasila is not socialised from the community to the community. The declining number 
of people who are pro-Pancasila is evenly distributed across various education levels. The pro-
Pancasila community among elementary school graduates in 2005 reached 86.5%, in 2010 it reached 
83.1%, in 2015 it reached 80.1%, and in 2018 it reached 76.3%. Whereas pro-Pancasila junior high school 
graduates in 2005 reached 84.7%, in 2010 it was 81.3%, in 2015 it reached 80.0%, and in 2018 it was 
76.5%. For high school graduates, the pro-Pancasila in 2005 reached 83.3%, in 2010 it reached 80.1%, in 
2015 it reached 78.4%, and in 2018 it was 74.0%. For those who have studied or above who are pro-
Pancasila, in 2005 it reached 82.2%, and this percentage continues to decline. In 2018, the percentage 
reached 72.8% (Arismunandar, 2019). 
The increasing of trans-national Islamic ideology cannot be separated from the fundamental 
changes in life in daily life, where currently many people spend their time in front of televisions. The 
rise of religious films with a nuance in the middle east has had great success in Indonesia. The movie 
of "Ayat-Ayat Cinta", for example, a film that features a woman wears a niqab sucks 3.7 million viewers. 
There has never been an Indonesian cinema that touches the inner depths of the majority of young 
Muslim people besides this film. In addition to breaking the record number of viewers, the film has 
also succeeded in attracting new types of viewers, namely adult females in a religion study group and 
people who live in the suburbs with limited literacy levels. These two groups have never been to a 
movie theatre before (Heryanto, 2015). The success of these religious-themed films is a picture of the 
current situation of Indonesian society, namely that there is a big ideological competition that plays 
behind the scenes after the end of the New Order regime, which is marked by the start of the process 
of "Post-Islamization" in Indonesian society. The Islamization process referred to here is expanding the 
worldview, appearance and celebration of material elements and practices that contain Islamic values 
in society (Heryanto, 2015). Finally, a new group of modern Indonesian Muslims was formed, mostly 
loved by the younger generation. This new generation of Muslims is also separated from the religious 
authority of old figures, who are considered to have been linked to national power. Since then, a kind 
of moral movement and purification of religion has been pioneered by various Islamic ideologies from 
the Middle East that are considered to be in conflict with local cultural styles and erode the 
nationalism's integrity of citizens.  
Besides, a strong awareness of identity as a nation will be a grand alternative that can curb smaller 
identity groups or encourage tolerance in plural societies. Conversely, the rise of the number of women 
wears niqab in society as a result of the strengthening of the ideology of transnational Islam is often 
associated with the weakening of national consciousness. These face-to-face conditions have 
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consequences for strengthening ethnonationalism as a reaction to the strengthening of group identity 
sentiments. Our society is getting used to hearing the clash of opinions in public and the mass media 
in the form of symbolic slogans, for example: Choose which, the Tawhid Flag versus the Red and White 
Flag, Defending the State versus Defending the Religion of God, the Indonesian Movement without 
Dating, to the Republic of Indonesia amidst sharia versus Humane Public Spaces. 
In Indonesia, especially in Palopo, "Indonesianness" is often threatened because of the massive 
reproduction of identity values through religion, from the phenomenon of "hijrah" of millennials to the 
effects of the religious-political movement of 212. Many female students originally only wore a 
headscarf. Ordinary people have now shifted to wearing the veil and believe in secrecy as a symbol of 
women's highest piety. The real thing that can be seen from how they greet each other using Arabic 
and often wearing signs of religious movements, ranging from key chains, hats, and bags, is inscribed 
with the words tauhid. The image of women fighting for emancipation did not in any way offend Raden 
Adjeng Kartini; they idolised women in the Islamic tradition from a very traditional perspective. 
A strong impulse of identity into public forces the nation to build a citizen self-management 
system that distinguishes two regions: public and private. Because every citizen has different private 
attitudes, the state limits the private attitude so that it does not interfere with the rights of others. The 
program for managing these different identity interests is divided into two.  First, there are legal rules 
that force them to respect the interests of other identities for their own sake.  Second, the state does not 
deal with the private attitudes of its citizens, nor will it carry out a moral or political intervention into 
the private matters of citizens. As Immanuel Kant said, no one, including the government, can force us 
to be happy in his way (Hardiman, 2018). 
The fundamental question that arises here is from the perspective of Niqab students, to what extent 
do religious groups desire to actualise their ideology and identity in a plural society? Collecting data 
in this study using purposive sampling, selecting who is the best subject in the population to provide 
the information needed, with unique characteristics, namely veiled female students who are part of or 
have studied from an Islamic religious organisation. This sample was selected based on the sample 
taken by the data following the research objectives (Silalahi, 2012). Data were collected by distributing 
questionnaires with closed questions to 30 religious groups such as Wahdah, Salafi, HTI, KAMMI, and 
HMI. The questions in the questionnaire are always directed to answer the questions, as shown in table 
1. 
Table 1 Variables and Research Question Formation 
 
Identity Variable 
Affirmation of Identity 
Pancasila Position in the Group 




Perception Towards the Government 
Attitudes Toward State Rules 
Level of Group Acceptance of Government Leaders of Different Religions 
Respondents' answers to each research question were then analysed using descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics is a procedure for organising and presenting information in a form that can be 
used, communicated, or understood (Silalahi, 2012). The number of respondents who answered each 
research question was added up, and this number was considered to represent the opinions and 
attitudes of the respondents towards each research question. Furthermore, the data is described in a 
step-by-step discussion by presenting the data in a descriptive, analytic, and argumentative manner. 
2. Two Mainstream Views on the Niqab 
The niqab is a head covering cloth or face for women. In Arabic, the veil also means niqab, a shar'i 
term for the veil used for Muslim women (Zempi, 2019). The use of the niqab is an important part of 
the life experiences of many Central and Southeast Asian people. From various studies on the niqab 
that many parties have done can be classified into two big topics. First, the niqab is seen as a traditional 
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value. Many of the research themes in this section discuss the niqab and religious identity, morality, 
ideology and belief. This is seen in Hanna Papanek's research on  Purdah: Separate Worlds and Symbolic 
Shelter. The use of niqab in Central Asian society, said Hanna, is a system of seclusion of women from 
the public sphere and a high standard of woman decency. An important characteristic of the purdah 
system is the limitations of women in interacting between women and men (Papanek, 1973). Hanna 
Papanek compares different categories of niqab usage between Muslims and Hindus. The Muslim 
purdah limit does not apply in the immediate family unit but only outside it. 
In contrast, the Hindu purdah is based on avoidance rules between a woman and her male affinity. 
Muslim seclusion began at puberty, the actual Hindu ex-communication starting with marriage 
(Papanek, 1973). Uma Bhowon and Harsha Bundhoo also conducted a similar study of the reasons for 
veiling by young Muslim women in social contexts where ethnic or religious identity was not contested 
or threatened. The five-year qualitative study found normative reasons why Muslim women use the 
niqab, ranging from arguments of loyalty and commitment to religious values—not limited to a piece 
of clothing. Modesty is considered an important dimension of the veil and is prescriptive, a reminder 
to live their lives according to the Muslim belief system (Bhowon & Bundhoo, 2016). 
Second, the niqab is seen as part of the phenomenon of modernity that has come in contact with 
various fields, such as lifestyle, social status, religious politics, gender, feminism, emancipation, bodily 
autonomy, to the economy. Maurisa Zinira in Indonesia researched this theme. In the article  The Politics 
of Veiling: A Study of Hijab and Female Muslim Identity Representation in Indonesia, Maurisa discusses the 
use of niqab as a forming identity and as a way to discipline women's bodies (Zinira, 2017).  Maurisa 
also described the shift in the meaning of the veil, ranging from the use of the veil as a religious identity, 
social status to the use of the hijab in economic and lifestyle aspects. A broader and deeper perspective 
has also been described by  Anna Mari Almila at her introduction inside  Handbook to Veil and Veiling, 
Introduction: The Veil across the Globe in Politics, Everyday Life, and Fashion. Anna begins her 
description of the origins of the niqab found in the tradition of the Ibrahim religion (Almila, 2017), then 
proceed to look at the political aspects and institutionalisation of the niqab law on women's bodies, 
starting from the individual, group, and state levels, as a way of controlling women throughout human 
history (Almila, 2017). The practice of the veiling of women has been exclusively associated with Islam 
and is persistently interpreted as being entirely repressive of women (Asha, 2008). 
The debate about wearing a niqab continues. Various assumptions are attached to the niqab, 
positive or negative women, seclusion or freedom, choice of faith or lifestyle, and so on. But Md. 
Research Mahmud Hasan found something else. He identifies wearing niqab in everyday life by 
Muslim women potentially misused by men, used for diametrically opposite purposes. This Islamic 
dress for women can be squandered by the patriarchal power system and the women themselves 
(Hasan, 2018). In many European countries, the ban on wearing niqab in public is not in harmony with 
the values of freedom and human equality. Also, the niqab is considered a symbol of oppression against 
women (Zempi, 2019). 
Other opinions about wearing niqab in Muslim women's communities come from ethnographic 
research which conducted by SameeraTahira Ahmed and Thomas Bernard Roche in Oman. The results 
of the study show that wearing niqab by women in Oman does not always originate from Islamic legal 
law, but rather personal choices that are rooted in the Islamic idea of piety and respect and that non-
Muslim countries must respect the freedom of women to dress according to their religious beliefs 
(Ahmed & Roche, 2018). Irene Zempi also carried out similar research. In addition to the veil as a 
personal choice, Irene found niqab as a form of Muslim women's negation of western cultures and 
lifestyles that are not in accordance with Islamic values (Zempi, 2016). Wearing a niqab is considered a 
moral movement and obedience to religion, and most importantly, it allows them to maintain a 
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3. Identity Variable 
Affirmation of Identity 
Niqab students in Palopo City have a strong interest in attending group activities to form identity 
confirmation. As many as 53.3% of respondents answered strongly agree that their attachment to the 
group was very intense; at least once every week, they felt the need to attend group events, 33% 
answered agreed, and another 13% disagreed, as shown in table 2. 
Table 2 Affirmation of Identity 
Response Category Number of Respondents Percentage 
Strongly Agree 16 53.3 % 
Agree 10 33.3 % 
Disagree 4 13,4 % 
Strongly Disagree - - 
Position of Pancasila in the Group 
However, although the percentage of confirmation of identity is very high, recognising Pancasila 
as the basis of the state also received a very high response. As many as 56.6% of respondents accept 
Pancasila as the basis of the state even though the group values strongly bind them, 16.7% answered 
strongly agree, and 26.7% others disagree, as shown in table 3. 
Table 3 Position of Pancasila in the Group 
Response Category Number of Respondents Percentage 
Strongly Agree 5 16.7 % 
Agree 17 56.6 % 
Disagree 8 26.7 % 
Strongly Disagree - - 
Perceptions Towards other groups 
About perceptions of other groups, respondents tend to assume that other values or other groups 
in their environment are not a problem in the group. However, this percentage is not far from those 
who argue otherwise. As many as 43.3% of respondents answered the values of other groups could be 
a threat to the values in the group, 46.7% answered the values of other groups were not a problem in 
the group, and another 10% answered did not question at all the existence another group, as shown in 
table 4. 
Table 4 Perceptions Towards other groups 
Response Category Number of Respondents Percentage 
Strongly Agree - - 
Agree 13 43,3 % 
Disagree 14 46,7 % 
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4. Nationality Variable 
Perceptions Towards the Government  
About perceptions of government, as many as 10% of respondents answered strongly agree that 
the role of government is not much to help the problems of daily life, 50% give answers agree, and 40% 
disagree as shown in table 5. 
Table 5 Perceptions Towards the Government 
Response Category Number of Respondents Percentage 
Strongly Agree 3 10 % 
Agree 15 50 % 
Disagree 12 40 % 
Strongly Disagree   
Attitudes Toward State Rules 
As many as 50% of respondents agreed to follow state law rules about attitudes towards state rules 
even though it contradicted the values in the group, 43% answered disagree, and 6.7% strongly 
disagreed, as shown in table 6. 
Table 6 Attitudes Toward State Rules 
Response Category Number of Respondents Percentage 
Strongly Agree - - 
Agree 15 50 % 
Disagree 13 43 % 
Strongly Disagree 2 6,7 % 
5. Group Acceptance Rates for Government Leaders of Different Religions  
The level of acceptance of respondents towards government leaders of different religions, as many 
as 66.7% of respondents strongly disagree with leaders of different religions, 20% disagree, and only 
13.3% agree, as shown in table 7. 
Table 7 Group Acceptance Rates for Government Leaders of Different Religions 
Response Category Number of Respondents Percentage 
Strongly Agree - - 
Agree 4 13,3 % 
Disagree 6 20 % 
Strongly Disagree 20 66.,7 % 
6. Identity and Nationalism 
Niqab female students in Palopo City have a strong interest in making or attending group activities 
as identity confirmation. This can be seen from the fairly high sample response, as shown in table 8. 
However, although the percentage of confirmation of identity is very high, recognising Pancasila as the 
basis of the state also received a very high response. In terms of perceptions of other groups, 
respondents tend to assume other values or other groups in their environment are not a problem in the 
group. However, 43.3% of other respondents consider that to be a problem. 
In the aspect of nationality variables, overall, 60% of niqab female students in Palopo City tend to 
assume that the government does not play many roles in overcoming the problems of people's lives; 
the other 40% answers the opposite. Regarding their attitude to state rules, 50% of respondents agreed 
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to follow state law even though it contradicted the values in the group, 43% answered disagree, and 
6.7% strongly disagreed. The level of group acceptance of government leaders of different religions is 
very low, at 13.3%, while 86.7% of other respondents disagree. 
Table 8 Main Identity and Nationalism 
Variable Response Category% 
SA A D SD 
Identity Variable     
Affirmation of Identity 53.3 % 33.3 % 13:4. - 
Pancasila Position in the Group 16.7 % 56.6 % 26.7 % - 
Perception Towards groups - 43.3 % 46, 7% 10 % 
Nationality Variable     
Perception Towards the Government 10 % 50 % 40 % - 
Attitudes Toward State Rules - 50 % 43 % 6-7 % 
Level of Group Acceptance of Government Leaders 
of Different Religions 
- 13.3 % 20 % 66.7% 
Table 8 shows, strengthening the existence of niqab female students does not significantly 
influence the stance of Pancasila as the principle of the nation. However, the 26.7% number that has not 
accepted Pancasila so far sufficiency creates subversion in public. They continue to preserve religious 
issues and isolate themselves exclusively. Respondents tend not to cooperate with followers of other 
religions in humanitarian matters. This condition confirms the high percentage of rejection of other 
groups' identities which reached 43.3%. This syndrome indicates one thing, specifically the social 
inequality that is still wide open in our society (Hardiman, 2018). Said Hannah Arendt, the basic 
experience of the republic is the feeling of togetherness among fellow citizens who are equally strong 
to organise public life in the excitement that is not alone (Arendt & Jaspers, 1955). But the principle of 
democracy deteriorates not only if equality disappears but also if the spirit of excessive equality. 
As to the government's viewpoint, overall, 60% of respondents said that the government did not 
help much in the problems of their daily lives. Respondents tend to answer that the existing system 
and governance cannot solve poverty and civil rights problems. They said that the government has not 
fully complied with the law that it made itself. They even tend to agree that fighting for an Islamic 
government system is an obligation that every Muslim in Indonesia must carry out. 
Another finding from this study is the high percentage of people who disagree with leaders of 
different religions. Overall, 86.7% of respondents denied the leaders from another religion, even though 
they realised justice and social welfare. This high tendency for identity erodes rationality in public. Our 
country that embraces the ideology of Pancasila is not a country that is too secular but also not a 
religious state. The ideology of Pancasila takes the middle ground of the two tensions. Although in 
reality (real politics), we see Islam as the majority religion getting privileges from the government, 
whether in the form of services, rights, infrastructure, MUI Fatwa, regional regulations (Sharia 
regulations), to the Sharia banking system (read Sharia Bank). Privileges from this government do not 
mean not good. That is a compromise born of a sophisticated political strategy to maintain social 
solidarity in a pluralistic society on one side. However, on the other hand, the cessation of Majority 
Privilege with democracy will have consequences at a very high price, that democracy will fail to care 
for individuals to be rational citizens (Civic reasons). 
7. Affiliate Level 
In the life of the nation and state, the religion that is present in the public sphere is not merely an 
attribute of identity, such as membership in a party or professional group, which can be moved and 
replaced at any time, the religion that is present in the public sphere is a package of worldviews 
(comprehensive world view). Because it is a complete package of outlook on life, we witness the totality 
of religious practitioners practising the values they profess in everyday life, ranging from sleeping, 
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waking, eating, dressing to ideal leadership and state concepts. The following is the level of affiliation 
of veiled female students to in groups feeling, families and nationalism: 
Table 9 Affiliate Level 
Comparison Category Response Category% 
SA A SA A 
In Group Feeling 46,7 % 53,3 % - - 
Family vs In Group 13, 3 % 50 % 26,7 % 10 % 
Local Culture vs In Group  10% 46,7% 43,3% 
State Vs vs Group 16.7 % 56.6 %  26.7% 
College students in Palopo are strongly attached to their groups. Meanwhile, if the respondents 
might choose between the family ties and the religious groups, the knot to the family and its values 
were quite high, namely 63.3%, while the ties to the groups were 36.7%. Furthermore, if the respondents 
were ordered to choose between local or group values, their choice of local values was only  10%, while 
the ties to the groups reached 90%. Finally, if the respondent is faced with the choice between countries 
and groups, the attachment to the nation is 73.3%, while the group commitment is only 26.7%. 
Table 9 shows the level of their relationship with family is high. The family is one of the main 
reference sources in shaping life values, attitudes, and choices. In the context of our society, which is 
known to be weak in individual economic autonomy, the family's tendency in life is very high. This is 
also reinforced by religious values, which say that "heaven is under the feet of the mother". The 
weakness of individuals autonomy strengthens the tendency of collectivity in culture, but in this 
research, the collective adherence in the local culture is only 10%; Indeed, in the history of the 
Indonesian people, the communitarian spirit of religion has a great interest. There are several big 
conflicts at the hand of the Race and Religion (SARA) issues had tarnished the image of Indonesia as a 
plural state. Meanwhile, the affiliation of respondents to the nation is still very high, as seen in table 9 
above. But loyalty to the country above is not unconditional loyalty, but conditional faithfulness, where 
cultural and religious groups coincide with openness in a duel of opinion in public, even competing to 
influence government policy. 
The conclusions of this study indicate that the community of women wear niqab strengthen 
significantly. The strengthening of these identities is not the only one of religious parties but spread 
widely in various religious groups. It means that this point of view exclusively belongs to groups that 
assume Wahabism and are also starting to grow in other Islamic groups. The strengthening of trans-
national Islamic identities also implies significant cultural group harmony. The willingness of 
respondents to leave local cultural values for the values of religious groups is a form of transformation 
of communitarianism, culture, religious religiousism. Regarding the position of the state, respondents 
assessing the current nation legality is still very strong. However, as stated above, religious groups try 
to incorporate religious laws into the official state regulations in the form of regional regulations (Sharia 
regulations), the development system, to the Criminal Code. Regarding the acceptance of students who 
wear niqab by the state, many agencies or government institutions do not allow women to wear the 
niqab in public, including religious institutions. Even many Islamic campuses do not allow wearing 
niqab in the campuses. Respondents' attitudes to state tendencies such as this can be repudiated in the 
form of opinion in religious, moral nuances in social media.  They believe that the niqab is a way of self-
purification of a world filled with sin. Instead, they are surprised by the state forbidding niqab but 
allowing miniskirts. 
There are three causes of the above research findings: First, the weakness of the critical mind makes 
it easy to move the student into that closed religious understanding. Secondly, the liability of individual 
autonomy and the strong tendency of the collectivity of religious groups to make students do not have 
many choices that ultimately make the groups a second family, so they have to protect it. They also 
tend to disagree with the feminist movement, emphasising equality, independence, and liberation of 
women from all kinds of patriarchal traps. Third, the intensive flow of Islamic ideology in the light of 
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Humanism in public and social media and the lack of socialisation of Pancasila makes alternative ideas 
willingly accepted by the mass of students. 
8. Conclusion 
"Indonesianness" is constantly under threat due to the massive reproduction of identity values 
through religion. This symptomatic politics of identity is an obstacle in the practice of Indonesian 
democracy. There is a powerful tendency for citizens of faith, especially female students, to be veiled 
towards the moral problem of justice rather than the ethical problem of a good life. Many citizens of 
the country of faith have the motivation to obey the law only if the rule also comes from religious 
values. Indeed, the role of the public religion in Indonesia cannot be avoided; the state itself has 
guaranteed freedom of religion. The state needs sophisticated political instruments. Religious 
aspirations like this in the public sphere should not be countered with rational arguments. They must 
be treated like an endangered species that must be protected. While believing, citizens have become 
accustomed to translating the "home language" of their religion into "public language" to convince their 
listeners who are secular or from other faiths. 
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